Purpose -The purpose of this paper is to explore whether socially responsible firms recognize the potential conflicts that come with higher levels of executive compensation, and thus limit executive pay relative to what is being paid in other firms. In the process, the relationships between executive compensation and financial performance, and corporate social performance and financial performance are examined to determine whether potential compensation and social performance links are coming at the expense of company financial performance.
pay of the typical worker -for most such pay was seen as a reward so long as companies were making money and the economy was thriving. The assumption, generally built on an agency theory foundation (Tosi et al., 2000; Murphy, 1999) , is that while overall pay might be increasing, it would rise and fall to at least some degree with the profitability of the company. With the economic crisis, however, many are now questioning the appropriateness of the levels of compensation and even wondering if the structure of executive compensation might encourage actions by executives that contribute to the broader economic problems. What is more, both anecdotal and empirical work indicates that executive pay does not in fact correlate much, if at all, with the fortunes of the company (O'Reilly and Main, 2010; Tosi et al., 2000; Barkema and Gomez-Mejia, 1998 ).
Considered in this way, the area of executive compensation begins to intersect with considerations of corporate social responsibility. Interestingly, though executive compensation is one of the more studied topics within the management literature (Miles et al., 2007) , there is limited intersection with corporate social responsibility. When the literatures have overlapped, it has typically been in examining the ethics of specific compensation schemes (e.g. stock options, Adam and Schwartz, 2009) or in seeing whether particular responsible acts were rewarded (Berrone and Gomez-Mejia, 2009 ). Little if any work has focused on the broader question of whether socially responsible firms will recognize the potential conflicts that come with higher levels of executive compensation and thus, on average, limit their pay relative to what is being paid in other firms. That is, might the socially responsible firm seek to better balance compensation across the firm and emphasize that profit, both individual and corporate, must be earned within a system that is fair and balanced for all?
In the pages that follow, we will develop this argument further. First we explore the literature on executive compensation, especially its relationship to company performance, as well as introduce the broad corporate social performance literature. Attention then shifts to the linkage between executive compensation and corporate social performance, culminating in the development of specific hypotheses. Measures are described such that an analytical approach may be utilized to test the hypotheses. Finally, a presentation of the results and discussion of the implications are offered in conjunction with some suggestions for future research in this largely under explored research arena.
Review and hypotheses
Executive compensation and corporate social performance are well studied topic areas within the management literature. To date, however, there has been limited work that has incorporated both topics in a single study, particularly when examining the broader level issues that are the focus here. As a result, we will pull from both research streams to create a broad foundation for the current work and develop a rich logical argument linking the disparate pieces.
Executive compensation
Executive compensation has received significant attention in both academic research and the popular business press. In both cases, the primary focus is on the relationship between executive pay and firm performance (Tosi et al., 2000) . The general idea being of course; are companies who pay more for executives getting an appropriate return in profits? In the popular press, this was most famously captured in an annual series of reports from Business Week on ''Who made the most and are they worth it?''.
The research literature, while couched in more academic terms, is primarily focused on this same notion. Much of this work stems from an agency theory perspective (Jensen and Mecklin, 1976; Jensen and Murphy, 1990) and examines how executive compensation can be structured so as to align the interests of hired executives with those of the stockholders who are the actual owners of the company (Murphy, 1999) . The concern is that executives who are earning a large salary may be more interested in maintaining their salary than growing the value of the company, and may make decisions that serve self rather than company interests. Given this, research has examined whether different compensation packages, particularly those ostensibly tied to company performance such as stock options or bonuses based on sales or profit, lead to different actions by the CEO and/or executive team (Abowd and Kaplan, 1999) .
On the whole, though, this research has not revealed any straightforward relationship between executive pay and company performance (Hallock et al., 2010; Barkema and Gomez-Mejia, 1998) . That is, increased executive pay, whether for the CEO alone or for the top management as a whole, is not clearly associated with increased firm performance (O'Reilly and Main, 2010) . This seems to be the case whether the compensation is direct or contingent on performance (Coombs and Skill, 2003) . As a result, a variety of alternative explanations have been explored. Some of these have focused on what might be called characteristics of the position, such as the amount of managerial discretion afforded the executives (Finkelstein and Boyd, 1998) , the degree of risk and innovation the executives undertake (Balkin et al., 2001) , and the information processing demands faced by the executives (Henderson and Fredrickson, 1996) . Other studies have examined such non-job related factors as the social relationships between the CEOs and their boards, and the willingness of a board to compare executive compensation packages with those at other firms (O'Reilly et al., 1988; Belliveau et al., 1996) .
Despite this extensive research, though, there appears to be consensus on only two points related to executive compensation. One is that top management compensation is positively related to firm size, with pay increasing as firms become larger (Murphy, 1999) . While the actual impact of size is open to debate, one meta-analysis suggested that size accounted for over 40 percent of the variance in CEO pay (Tosi et al., 2000) . The other is that executive compensation has increased dramatically over the last 30 to 40 years (Anderson et al., 2008) . Average CEO pay for Fortune 500 companies, depending how calculated, is now nearly $9,000,000 (Anderson et al., 2010; AFLCIO Corporate Watch, 2010) . As a comparison, this is nearly 70 times the level of pay of a four star general in the US Army [1] . What is more, this increase in executive compensation has been at a much higher rate than the rate of inflation and is significantly higher than the increase in wages in most other areas. It has been argued, for example, that if worker wages had increased at the same rate as CEO pay over the past 30 years, the average worker would be making over $100,000 and the minimum wage would be nearly $23 per hour (Anderson et al., 2008) .
As executive compensation has increased, and as it becomes increasingly clear that there is not a definitive relationship between executive pay and company performance, questions are being raised more regularly about the propriety of such high levels of compensation. The Clinton administration, for example, pushed through legislation in the late 1990s that limited the amount of direct compensation for executives that could be written off on taxes to $1 million. Anything above that amount had to be based on ''pay for performance'' if the company wanted to deduct it. While some question whether these caps actually served as a constraint (Polsky, 2007; Abowd and Kaplan, 1999) , the economic crisis in the late 2000s has generated calls for more extreme restrictions and at least some have been enacted. For example, congress included restrictions on executive pay as explicit conditions on government assistance to companies caught up in the economic downturn and the Securities and Exchange Commission has passed a ruling that gives shareholders of public companies the right to vote on whether they think the executive compensation package is appropriate (Lynch, 2011) . While the vote is not binding on the company, the belief is that a firm would have a hard time maintaining a compensation scheme that shareholders had formally rejected.
There are still those, however, who raise concerns about restricting executive pay, with most arguing that limiting pay will constrain the ability of firms to attract the best talent and thus will negatively impact firm performance. These arguments, though, appear to be based mostly on circumstantial evidence or a general appeal to capitalism and free markets. As noted, there is little evidence that links firm performance with executive salaries on any consistent basis and there is at least anecdotal evidence from other fields (e.g. entertainment and sports) that large contracts may reward past accomplishments or other connections as much as drive future performance (Brick et al., 2006) . Overall, it is clear that where once companies such as Ben and Jerry's and Whole Foods Market were outliers in trying to limit CEO pay, more emphasis today is being focused on examining what executives are making, whether it is tied to company performance in some way, and whether there should be some upper limit on executive compensation.
Linking executive compensation to corporate social performance
Corporate social performance is used to refer to a wide range of corporate activity, ranging from very specific (e.g. efforts to support work/life balance, energy reduction) to broader conceptions of ''doing the right thing'' (Griffin and Mahon, 1997) . Clearly, some of the movement for restrictions on executive pay is based on philosophical ''do the right thing'' grounds (Rowlingson and Connor, 2010) . That is, people feel there is something unfair about executives earning millions, especially while workers are being laid off. For example, a recent report from a Christian investment group argued for not investing in companies where executive to worker pay ratios were high (Higginson and Clough, 2010) , and Anderson et al. (2010) noted that in the 50 firms that laid off the most workers in 2009, average CEO pay was significantly higher than in the Fortune 500 as a whole.
In general, though, corporate social performance connotes a focus on company actions that have a positive influence on society. Following this logic in the executive compensation debate are arguments that suggest that excessive executive compensation actually has a direct negative effect on both companies and society. From a company perspective, it has been argued that paying high levels of executive compensation can actually significantly affect shareholder profits (Bebchuck and Grinstein, 2005) . In addition, high levels of executive pay may result in less motivated and more cynical workers (Wade et al., 2006; Anderson and Bateman, 1997) . There is also at least some evidence to suggest that higher levels of executive pay result in a loss in tax revenue because of a variety of tax loopholes that allow companies to write off more of the compensation than has been intended (Anderson et al., 2008) . Given the previous discussion, it is therefore reasonable to consider whether there is a relationship between a company's executive compensation and its broader corporate social performance.
The extensive work on executive compensation, however, has tended to focus on specific aspects of compensation or the general ethics of increased compensation and not on the relationship between compensation and corporate social performance. For example, work has been done focusing on particular compensation schemes, such as looking at the ethics of stock options and how they are valued (Adam and Schwartz, 2009; Angel and McCabe, 2008) . This is particularly true when considering whether stock options can be ''back-dated'' to provide a greater compensation and how much of the value can be written off in taxes (see Bernile and Jarrell, 2009; Bizjak et al., 2009; Narayanan and Seyhun, 2008) . Other work has begun examining the relationship between specific firm actions, such as environmental practices, and executive compensation (e.g. Berrone and Gomez-Mejia, 2009; Coombs and Gilley, 2005) . At a broader level, researchers have examined the general ethics of executive compensation, and commented on the likely effectiveness of various practices and approaches to keeping executive compensation in check (e.g. Matsumura and Shin, 2005; Ashley and Yang, 2004; Perel, 2003; Rodgers and Gago, 2003) .
The direct link between executive compensation and corporate social performance, however, remains understudied. That is, is there a relationship between a firm's level of executive compensation and its level of corporate social performance? While most of the work cited previously argues, implicitly if not explicitly, that excessive compensation is not in line with a socially responsible philosophy, determining where compensation becomes excessive is problematic. In at least some instances there may be an argument for providing incentives to executives for adopting specific socially responsible actions (Berrone and Gomez-Mejia, 2009) , and it would seem to be a ''no good deed goes unpunished'' situation if executives were to suffer a decrease in pay for ''doing the right thing''. This would suggest that compensation may actually increase as a company is more socially responsible.
Linking increased compensation to increasing social performance in this manner, however, relies on a traditional economic view that uses money as the primary measure of success and happiness. Recent work at the confluence of psychology and economics, however, calls such a view into question. An increasingly extensive research stream has been examining what can broadly be viewed as the connection between money and happiness, with at least some of this research focusing on the ability of money to motivate and drive behavior (Srivastava et al., 2001 . An emerging consensus from this literature appears to be that while money may be a primary motivator at low levels of income, its value decreases fairly rapidly as income increases (McBride, 2010 , Frijters et al., 2004 , Frey and Stutzer, 2002 . This would suggest that other factors besides money may well play a larger role in driving behavior for executives who are already in the top 1 percent of income.
When looking at executive compensation on the whole, then, the case for socially responsible firms restricting expenditures on executive compensation is compelling. The logic to suggest a relationship is fairly straightforward. Companies that emphasize corporate social performance are likely to recognize and acknowledge the demotivating potential of large gaps between worker pay and executive pay highlighted by Wade et al. (2006) and Anderson and Bateman (1997) . Further, they are likely to be interested in sharing value created by the company with all stakeholders, not just upper management (Higginson and Clough, 2010; Freeman, 1984) . This would include stockholders, since money not spent on executives is a savings that can translate directly to the bottom line (Anderson et al., 2008) . It would also include the broader society, whether through higher taxes or through corporate philanthropy, both of which may be possible because of larger earnings.
Taken together, this would suggest an inverse relationship between executive compensation and corporate social performance. That is, companies that show greater corporate social performance will spend relatively less money on executive compensation. Where exactly such decreased spending will manifest, however, is not clear. The most likely emphasis will be on CEO compensation. Reducing CEO pay, especially in the face of economic challenge, allows a company to make a strong statement of commitment to all of its stakeholders. Thus, our first hypothesis is:
H1. There will be an inverse relationship between CEO compensation and corporate social performance for a firm.
A second area where decreased executive compensation might be seen is with the broader top management team. While not as visible to the public as the CEO, compensation for the upper tier executives has risen at similar rates to CEO pay and is likely to be visible inside the company. Again, it allows a company to make a fairly clear statement about its culture if it puts at least some emphasis on keeping a reasonable cap on compensation for all executives. Thus, it is hypothesized that:
H2. There will be an inverse relationship between compensation for the top management team and corporate social performance for a firm.
A final area of interest is trying to evaluate the relationships between corporate social performance, firm financial performance, and executive compensation. The various literatures reviewed here, however, suggest that disentangling these relationships is likely to be difficult. As noted, the compensation literature indicates that the relationship between executive compensation and financial performance of the firm, while positive, is fairly small if it exists at all (Tosi et al., 2000) . Similarly, while corporate social performance has been shown to have some positive relationship to financial performance (Griffin and Mahon, 1997; Waddock and Graves, 1997) , a variety of questions have been raised regarding this relationship. These include questions of measurement (McWilliams and Siegel, 2000) , as well as causation and whether other variables may intervene (Waddock, 2004) .
A full discussion and examination of all the nuances of these relationships is beyond the scope of this paper. Given that this paper is one of the first to empirically examine the corporate social performance and executive compensation relationship, however, it seems reasonable to at least offer tentative hypothesis on these related relationships. In keeping with the general logic of the literatures, then, it is hypothesized that:
H3a. There will be a positive relationship between executive compensation and company financial performance.
H3b. There will be a positive relationship between corporate social performance and firm financial performance.
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Methods
To test the previous hypotheses, we were interested in a broad sample that was not subject to the recent turmoil caused by the economic downturn. We were also interested in being able to average data over a period of several years to minimize the influence of any external environmental influences in a particular year. Finally, we wanted to focus on firms where publicly available data could be found on all of the necessary measures. The result is that we focused on large (Fortune 1000) firms for the period from [2005] [2006] [2007] . The specifics of the sample and the measures are discussed in turn in the following.
Sample and measure of corporate social performance
Following past practice in corporate social performance research (e.g. McGuire et al., 1988; Griffin and Mahon, 1997) , we started with the 2007 Fortune most admired companies. Based on survey responses from executives, directors, and analysts, this listing is essentially a rating of the reputation of firms in the Fortune 1000. Firms were rated in each of eight categories: Innovation, people management, use of corporate assets, social responsibility, quality of management, financial soundness, long-term investment, and quality of products/services. Over 600 companies in 68 industry groups were rated. The companies in the top half in each industry, a total of 323 firms, were listed in the magazine. We considered that these firms were likely to be good corporate social performers and thus reasonable candidates for our sample.
While the most admired firms listing includes a specific component related to social responsibility and a number of other components that relate to common conceptions of what makes a ''good firm'' (e.g. people, quality, etc.), we wanted to triangulate this list with other measures. We considered three other measures, one perceptual and two based on the actions of the companies. The perceptual measure also came from Fortune and consisted of the listing of companies on the list of ''most accountable'' firms for 2007. Based on ratings of an independent panel, this measure looked at the responsiveness of companies to a broad range of stakeholders. Fortune listed 100 firms in these rankings.
The two action oriented measures, pulled from the Global Reporting Initiative and the UN Global Compact, were related to sustainability and reporting. While concerns have been raised regarding both of these initiatives (see Kell, 2005; Knight and Smith, 2008) , both continue to be extensively utilized by businesses and it was felt that utilizing them as one of several measures rather than as a single definitive source would minimize any problems. The Global Reporting Initiative encourages firms to make regular reports on their practices in areas such as sustainability and social performance. Companies were considered as possible good corporate social performers if they had filed reports in more than one of the three years in question. The second action oriented measure, the UN Global Compact, also encourages firms to adopt a common and transparent framework for reporting its commitment to human rights and social responsibility. Companies were considered as possible good corporate social performers if they were listed as being involved in the past five years.
The listings from all four sources were then compared and companies appearing in at least two sources were determined to be good social corporate performers and retained for further consideration. Finally, companies were examined to determine if they were publicly traded and thus subject to US reporting requirements that would be likely to make other needed data (particularly the executive compensation data) available. This process yielded 57 public companies considered to be good corporate social performers (good CSP) by virtue of their inclusion on at least two of the listings (50 of the firms had been on the Fortune Most Admired list as well as one or more additional listings).
To get a comparison group that was similar in size and industry makeup but not listed in more than one of our good CSP sources, we examined the rankings of each of the good CSP firms within their industry in the Fortune 1000 listings. For each firm, we selected for comparison the publicly traded firm from the same industry that most closely matched the good CSP firm in terms of size (based on revenue). The advantage of such an approach is that in addition to providing a matched comparison group it enables us to account for industry effects.
This resulted in a final sample of 114 firms, 57 in the good CSP group and 57 which served as the comparison group. All of these were publicly traded firms and all were ranked in the Fortune 1000, with most ranking in the top 500. Firms were dummy coded as 1 if they were in the good CSP group and dummy coded 0 if they were in the comparison group.
Other measures
Executive compensation. Reporting of compensation figures for the CEO and other upper executives is now required of publicly traded firms in the US data were collected from Compustat for the years 2005, 2006 and 2007. Compensation is reported in several different ways, depending on whether stock options are included and, if so, how they are valued. We collected data for both the basic salary and bonuses as reported to the SEC (labeled as ''SEC Pay'') as well as for the maximum valuation that could be achieved, which includes stock options valued at their highest possible value (labeled as ''Max Pay''). These data were collected for all firm executives reported on the company's SEC filings.
CEO compensation numbers were straight forward, being an average of the values for each of the three years. The measure of top executive team compensation was created as an average per executive for all executives for who data were reported so that we could control for different sizes of executive teams. The data were then averaged across the three years to account for any extreme values in a particular year. Once calculated, these executive pay values were correlated with firm size as measured by average revenue levels over the three-year period (as noted previously, Tosi et al. (2000) argue that company size may explain over 40 percent of the variance in executive compensation). In line with expectations, all four of the compensation measures were positively correlated with firm size, with both the CEO and average executive measures as reported to the SEC reaching significance (see Table I ). This relationship, along with the fact that the good CSP firms were, on average, slightly larger than the comparison group (see details in the following), lead us to divide the three-year compensation averages by the mean of the company revenues for the three years in order to control for company size.
Financial Performance. In general, the literature on executive compensation emphasizes aligning executive pay with the fortunes of stockholders. In this way, executives should focus on firm actions that benefit both parties. Accordingly, we sought financial performance measures that would reflect this underlying philosophy. Two measures were created. The first of these was Return on Sales, averaged across the three-year period to minimize the influence of any peculiarities in a single year. ROS is a fairly common profitability measure and has been shown to correlate highly with other 'return on' measures (e.g. ROA, ROI). It is possible, however, for a firm to show an accounting profit without necessarily returning any real value to the stockholders. Given this, we utilized a second measure that focused on the Total Return to Investors as reported in the 2007 Fortune 1000 rankings. This measure calculates returns based on both dividends and changes in stock price and may provide a broader performance measure than simply accounting profits.
Analysis and results
The final sample of companies used in this research, split into each of the two groups, is shown in Table II . As can be seen, there were 33 different broad industry segments represented, with the greatest number of firms coming from pharmaceuticals (ten firms, five good CSP and five comparison firms) and petroleum refining (eight firms, four in each category). The nature of the sample selection process is such that each group contains broadly the same industries and firms of similar size. The good CSP group is on average slightly larger, however, since in many instances these companies were the biggest in their industries and thus the competitor closest in size chosen for the comparison group was by necessity smaller. All are very large companies. The average Fortune 1000 rank of the good CSP group is 102 and the average Fortune 1000 rank of the comparison group is 169.
The means and standard deviations for the sample as a whole as well as for each of the groups on the various measures of interest are shown in Table III . Recall that the compensation numbers are calculated in relation to sales. Thus, the mean CEO pay reported to the SEC by the good CSP group is 0.077 percent of sales while the same figure for the comparison group is 0.134 percent. To put these numbers in perspective, the actual dollar value average across the entire sample for CEO compensation as reported to the SEC was a little over $21 million, while the average across all executives was just over $8 million. The simple correlations between the variables of interest are shown in Table IV .
Testing of the main hypotheses was done using a regression that included a two-step process. The regression was repeated 4 times, once for each of the executive compensation measures. In each regression, an executive compensation measure was utilized as the dependent variable, with the Total Return and average ROS measures of performance entered in Model 1 and the CSP dummy variable entered in Model 2. Done in this way, the relative influence of corporate social performance can be assessed after having controlled for any influence from financial performance. Results of each of the regressions are shown in Table V .
As can be seen, the results support H1 regarding the relationship between CEO compensation and social performance. After controlling for financial performance, the betas for the good CSP dummy variable are significant for both the value of CEO pay reported to the SEC and for the CEO maximum pay case. In both instances, the beta is negative and significant, suggesting the hypothesized inverse relationship is indeed apparent. Said differently, these data suggest that the CEO's of firms who are included in the good CSP group earn less on average than do the CEO's of firms in the comparison group.
Similar results are obtained for H2 regarding the relationship between average executive compensation and social performance. Here, the betas for the good CSP group are significant at p , 0.01 for both the maximum pay case and for the reported to the SEC case. Again, the betas are negative, suggesting executives at the good CSP firms are earning less on average than the executives in the comparison firms. Thus, H2 is supported.
H3a and H3b were examined through a new set of regression equations. Here, firm financial performance was used as the dependent variable, with executive compensation entered in model 1 and the CSP dummy variable entered in model 2. Note that model 1 is essentially the same as model 1 in the previous regression, with financial performance and executive compensation reversed between dependent and independent variable. In both cases, the primary focus of the analysis is the relatively influence of CSP on the outcome variable and the inclusion of the other variable is to control for its influence before examining the contribution of CSP. Because the four different measures of executive compensation are highly correlated, multicollinearity issues were likely to arise if all were included in the same equation. Instead, the regressions were run multiple times, each time using a different executive compensation variable. As was expected, the results were similar regardless of the executive compensation measure used and in the interest of space only the regressions that utilized the average compensation reported to the SEC are shown here (see Table VI ).
As can be seen, the results of model 1 mirror what was shown in the earlier regressions. That is, there is a positive and significant relationship between firm financial performance and executive compensation when examining the return on sales measure as the dependent variable, but not when using the total return measure. Further, the variance explained averages about 7 percent depending which of the executive compensation measures is used. Model 2 reflects a similar result. The CSP dummy variable is positive and significant when using the return on sales measure as the dependent variable. This indicates that the good CSP group has a higher return on sales level than does the comparison group. Further, including the CSP variable adds a little more than 5 percent to the explained variance. When total return is the dependent variable, however, the CSP dummy variable is not significant. Possible explanations for why there is a relationship in both instances with return on sales but not with total return will be explored in the discussion section, to which we now turn.
Discussion
While there are extensive literatures on both executive compensation and corporate social performance, the relationship between these areas has not generally been explored. The current economic crisis and the focus it has brought to executive pay, however, suggests that the time is ripe for such an investigation. The current study is a first step in examining this relationship and provides some intriguing findings.
On the whole, the results support the general proposition that companies that are viewed as being good corporate social performers will have a lower rate of executive compensation than will those who are not rated as good corporate social performers. Said differently, those in the good CSP group are more likely to keep executive compensation in check than are other firms. This was true for both the highest paid executive and for the average compensation of a top management team. It was also true whether compensation was measured using the base salary and bonus figure reported to the SEC, or measured using the maximum compensation value, a figure that took into account the highest possible value of stock options.
While at first blush this may suggest that top management is in some way being penalized for good corporate citizens, it is not clear that this is the case. All of the managers in the sample were being significantly rewarded for their work, with the average level of compensation nearing $8 million even in the more conservative computations. As noted earlier, at this level of pay there is likely to be little if any motivation generated by additional pay. The results suggest that managers at those companies characterized with good CSP may in fact be willing to sacrifice at least a piece of financial compensation for the intangible rewards of being seen as good corporate citizens and treating all employees fairly.
Perhaps the most surprising outcome, however, is that the results on compensation would be so consistent given the nature of the sample. The approach for creating the comparison group identified similar size companies from the same industries as those identified as good CSP firms, which meant that analysis was limited to a dichotomous rather than continuous variable. What is more, it means that the comparison group is not stacked with poor corporate social performers that would exaggerate differences between the groups. In fact, many of the companies in the comparison group actual appear on one of the four lists used to generate the sample of good corporate social performers. That means that the comparison is between good CSP firms and a general sample of other firms rather than between extremes of 'Great Performers' and 'Poor Performers'. Thus, this analysis can be considered a relatively conservative test of the relationship.
As expected, the analysis examining the relationship between executive compensation, and corporate social performance with financial performance produced a somewhat muddled picture. There was at least some evidence for a significant positive relationship between company financial performance and executive compensation. While there was no relationship with the total return measure, three of the four relationships between executive compensation and return on sales were significant in a positive direction. The relationship between corporate social performance and financial performance returned a similar pattern of results, showing a positive relationship between CSP and performance when return on sales was used, but no relationship with total return.
Whether the positive relationship with return on sales or the lack of a relationship with total return provides a better indicator of reality is not clear. It is possible that despite efforts to link executive compensation with shareholder outcomes, compensation measures are still generally tied more directly to simple profit measures like ROS that executives see as more directly within their control. As neither of these relationships was the primary focus of this research, we are hesitant to go to far in searching for an explanation. Still, the significant results found here for the relationship between CSP and return on sales at least give one reason to pause. As noted in the case of compensation and corporate social performance, the nature of the sample suggests that the current analysis provides a conservative test of the relationship, since the comparison group was by nature not necessarily that different from the good corporate social performers. Thus, this adds additional evidence to the ongoing CSP/CFP debate.
Conclusion
In a recent article, Waddock and McIntosh (2009) call for a rethinking of the way that business ''ought to operate''. They challenge researchers to look well beyond current ideas about corporate responsibility, business ethics, and corporate citizenship, and suggest that current theory may accept as given and fail to question whether the larger system itself is working and for who. In response to this call, this research responds to the growing concerns regarding executive compensation and examines the relationship between compensation and corporate social performance.
Future research, however, needs to extend this work into a variety of related areas. A natural extension would be to examine the relationship between executive compensation and the compensation of average workers within the company. While gaining access to accurate data may be difficult, a complete picture of a company's commitment to equitable compensation requires looking at lower levels as well as upper levels. In fact, it is our contention that the ratio of executive pay to average worker pay may provide a more direct measure of a firm's underlying belief in corporate social responsibility than other sets of actions that may reflect temporary investments and merely be a reaction to activist pressures or an effort to ''polish'' the corporate image.
Other traditional profit driven outcomes might also be examined. For example, companies spend significant time and money to limit the corporate taxes they pay. While this may enrich shareholders, it comes at the expense of the greater society. If we are in fact seeing a shift in beliefs from a short sighted perspective grounded in the clear intention to ''maximize shareholder wealth at all costs'' to a foundation of long term viability based on a corporations contribution to society (Waddock and McIntosh, 2009) , then this should be reflected in a shift in a variety of traditional practices. We are hopeful that the current examination of executive compensation and corporate social performance is a starting point for the discussion and examination of such shifts. To purchase reprints of this article please e-mail: reprints@emeraldinsight.com Or visit our web site for further details: www.emeraldinsight.com/reprints
